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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOUBLE "D" AMUSEMENT
COMP ANY, a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
10938

WILLIAM B. HAWKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages for breach of contract.
Plaintiff is a corporation and plaintiff's principal business was that of leasing and operating amusement devices, vending machines, and record playing machines.
Plaintiff claims that defendent wrongfully breached a
music machine location contract, which contract pro1

vided that a machine owned by plaintiff was to remain
in the defendant's place of business for a period of
five years.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
IN LOWER COURT
The trial Court entered judgment against the defendant for the amount of $1,332.75 together with interest from the lst day of July, 1964, in the amount of
$226.53.

THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
ON APPEAL
Defendant, appellant, seeks reversal of the trial
Court's judgment upon the question of damages, on
the theory that the plaintiff failed to introduce competent evidence as to his damages, if any.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the business of renting amusement machines, operating cigarette and candy vending machines, and music machines.
Plaintiff had eighty-three machines in operation during
the period in question (Tr. 24).
Defendant is the owner and operator of a lounge
known as the L-Roy Tavern and Lounge, located in
Orem, Utah.
..
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Plaintiff and defendant entered into a written
agreement dated October 16, 1963, which contract was
admitted in evidence as Exhibit A.
The machine described in Exhibit A was placed in
defendant's place of business, pursuant to the contract,
in October of 1963, and it remained in the defendant's
place of business until September of 1964. In September of 1964 the machine was removed from the defendant's premises.
There have been two trials in this matter. At the
conclusion of the first trial, the Court awarded damages
against the defendant in the amount of $560.00. A new
trial was granted and in the second trial the Court
awarded damages against the defendant in the amount
of $1,332.75 together with interest.
Defendant believes that the weight of the evidence
on the question of breach of contract favored the defendant. Since the evidence was in conflict, and there is
competent evidence on which the Court's decision on
that matter can be supported, defendant does not appeal
from that finding.
The second trial was conducted on the theory that
the Court had already determined that defendant was
liable for breach of contract. For that reason, the transcript does not reflect the evidence in full as it relates
to the question of breach of contract.
The record of the first hearing was not transcribed
nor transmitted to the Court on appeal. The record on
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this appeal does not show, but I think that respondent's
counsel will not question the fact, that the only records
which were kept with respect to the machine which
operated on the defendant's premises were records showing the collection of monies from the machine.
The practice of the plaintiff was to make weekly
collections, divide the receipts of the machine with the
defendant, and issue a written collection report to the
defendant showing the amount of money in the machine
and the manner of its division.
Aside from that record, the plaintiff did not have
any business records which showed either the income or
the cost of operating the particular machine in question.
This is shown on page 8 of the Transcript by plaintiff's
witness, Arvid Dodge, a certified public accountant and
plaintiff's accountant:
"Q (By Mr. Young) I don't know whether
the Judge heard or not. You told me that you
had no records that reflected or that related to
this particular machine, except for those records
which you furnished to me?
''A That's right, which was pertaining to the
depreciation itself.
"Q Or to its income, isn't that right?

"A This is right.
"Q And you had no records that relate~ to
expenses that related to this particular machme?
"A
"Q

That's correct.
So this is sheer guess work?
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"A That is what the statement says. It's an
estimated amount."
The foregoing testimony referred to the plaintiff's
Exhibit A-3, which was at first rejected by the Court
but later received as evidence of loss of profits.
The plaintiff's witnesses were its two principal
owners, David L. Wade and J. Dwain Westphal, and
its accountant, Arvid Dodge.
Plaintiff's business had a net operating loss in the
years both before and after the inception of the contract
here sued upon (Tr. 3_3). Wade's testimony reads as
follows:
"Q (By Mr. Young) Now, did the plaintiff
pay any tax to the Federal Government in any
one of those years?

"A

You mean income tax?

"Q

No. Income tax?

"A

Because it showed a net loss.

"Q

So you had a loss in all of those years?

"A

That's right.

"Q

On the 83 machines?

"A

That's right.

"Q

Is that right?

"A

That's right."

The plaintiff did not keep records of either receipts
or expenses with respect to the individual 83 machines.
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The plaintiff's witness, Wade, also testified in answer
to plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff had no records
relating to the expenses of individual machines. At
Transcript, page 28, he testified as follows:
"Q Would the repairs and maintenance cost
as shown on Exhibit A-3 have been different fo~
this machine than for other machines, in your
ownership at that time?

"A Yes, sir. I don't believe there is any way
that even if you have to break them down so there
was, let's say 25 juke boxes and 15 cigarette machines and a dozen pinball machines and you
break it down, there is no way that you can get
at a definite figure to go on the one machine, because when you buy one record, you buy records
for all machines. And when we buy a part for a
machine, we don't attribute it to any one given
machine. So the only argument we have is if you
use all music machines or just all machines, the
only thing we can do is attribute all the cost of
the machines - or of the route to these machines.
"And I think that we are over attributing to
this one machine, because I don't believe it would
take the amount of maintenance and repairs and
costs that we are attributing to it, because we had
a lot of older machines that have taken consider·
ably more maintenance.
"And the depreciation is broken down definite·
ly on the machine itself."
The plaintiff owned three machines exactly like
the one described in plaintiff's Exhibit A-1 and which
is the subject of this suit (Tr. 50). Plaintiff did not
know what happened to the machine after it was taken
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out of the place of business (Tr. 51). Probably the
plaintiffs were not without the services of the machine
in question for more than three weeks. At page 52 of
the Transcript the Court asks the witness "\IV ade the
question:
"Q How long were you without the services
of the one machine?
"A Now, of the individual machine, we were
probably not without the services of it very long.
But, of course, when we had it in service, we were
having one of our machines out of service. Just
the individual machine, I wouldn't say more than
two or three weeks.
"Q How long were you without the services
of these three machines that you had like this one?
"A Well, now, the one machine has never
been without service, because it went into The
"\Vilshire, and it was traded back on the next
model that came back.
"And the other two machines, of course, being
that they were newer machines, we have kept
them more or less in operation, and kept the
older ones off from operation, because we didn't
want them to sit in the shop. We figured the
potential was a little better on the newer ones
than it was on the older ones. We just thought
that thev would do a little better, because they
had the·thirty-three and a third and the fortyfive and you could play mixed records and things
like' this, 'and we figured it would help to give it
a little better chance to stay on location. So we
moved them out and moved the other ones in."

The record does not show what the income of the
machines was following the date of the removal of the
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plaintiff's machine from the defendant's premises or
at any time other than while one machine was located
in defendant's place of business.
When the newer machine, which was taken from
defendant's place of business, was put into operation,
an older machine was taken out of operation and put
in plaintiff's warehouse (Tr. 53).
The nature of Dodge's testimony can be fully understood when it is known that Dodge was the accountant for the plaintiff and yet took as his figure in arriving
at the loss of the plaintiff, a figure furnished to him by
the plaintiff's counsel.
At page 21 of the Transcipt the Court inquired
how the plaintiff had made the determination of a loss
of $67.50 per month of income:
"Q (By the Court) You don't know how
many of these are music machines and how many
are not?
"A Not off hand, I don't.
"Q May I ask where you got the figures that
were on that statement, the other one that we
excluded? The figures to begin with, sixty-seven
fifty per month?
"A I believe this was the one (indicating)?

"Q Yes. Fifty-four fifty. No, sixty-seven
fifty per month.
"MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I will t~ll
you where he got that. I furnished that to hun
because that was your computation.
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"And our computation was $7.90.
"And when you calculated it on the basis of
the average, and when you made your last decision, you determined that there was an income of
$67 .50 per month.
"THE COURT: I wondered who had been
reading my notes.
''MR. HOWARD: Well, I might as well roll
with the punches. That is what your calculations
were, and I read it down and figured it was
$67.50, and that was the finding of the Court on
that, and we calculated what the Court had
written on that."
The balance of the record demonstrates clearly that
the plaintiff did not keep any records as to his expenses
for the individual machines.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
AND OVER OBJECTION ADMITTED CONJ E C TUR AL AND SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE AS TO THE LOSS OF PROFIT
RESULTING FROM THE BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
The law respecting the degree of certainty required to establish loss of profits is stated in A.L.I.
"Restatement of the Law of Contracts," Sec. 331. That
section reads as follows:

9

" ( 1) Damages are recoverable for losses
caused or for prof its and other gains prevented
by the breach only to the extent that the evidence
affords a sufficient basis for estimating their
amount in money with reasonable certainty.
" ( 2 ) Where the evidence does not afford a
sufficient basis for a direct estimation of profits,
but the breach is one that prevents the use and
operation of property from which profits would
have been made, damages may be measured by
the rental value of the property or by interest on
the value of the property."
So far as we have been able to determine, there is
no jurisdiction which disagrees with the statement of
the law as enunciated in the Restatement. Many
authorities in support of the Restatement's position are
cited in 15 A. J. 550 "Damages," Sec. 149 and 150.
Another way of stating the rule announced by the Restatement is that profits in order to be recoverable may
not be uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative.
This is the law in Utah, B. T. Moran, Inc. v. First
Security Corporation, 24 P. 2d, 384.
It is familiar law that the testimony of a witness
is no stronger than as shown by cross-examination. Edwards v. Clark, 83 P. 2d, 1021; Oberg v. Sanders, 184
P. 2d, 229; Porter v. Hunter, 207 Pac. 153.

Plaintiff sought to prove his damages through
plaintiff's Exhibits A-3 and A-4, identified by plaintiff's witness as the product of guess work (Tr. 8).
This "Guess work" was not admitted by the Court
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at the conclusion of Mr. Dodge's testimony. At page 22
of the Transcript, the Court said.
"THE COURT: I think they are not ready
yet to be offered. Let's reserve a ruling on them
for the time being, and see if you can connect
them up with the other witnesses."
At this juncture, if the plaintiff's evidence was
tested by plaintiff'li witnesses' testimony on cross-examination, the evidence of a loss was "sheer guess work"
(Tr. 6-8).
The only evidence offered to qualify the exhibits
following the Court's ruling that Exhibits A-3 and A-4
were not admissible, was the testimony of Wade and
Westphal that in their opinion the estimates of Dodge
were correct.
That Dodge's testimony was not based upon competent evidence is further demonstrated by the manner
in which he, Dodge, determined the estimated income
from the machine. The following appears in the Transcript on pages 21-22:
"Q (By the Court) You don't know how
many of these are music machines and how many
are not?
"A

Not off hand, I don't.

"Q May I ask where you got the figures that
were on that other statement? The other one
that we excluded? The figures to begin with,
sixty-seven fifty per month?
"A I believe this was the one (indicating)?
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"Q Yes, Fifty-four fifty. No sixty-seven
fifty per month.
'
"MR. HO,VARD: Your Honor, I will tell
you where he got that. I furnished that to him
because that was your computation.
"And our computation was $7.90.
"And when you calculated it on the basis of
the average, and when you made your last decision, you determined that there was an income of
$67 .50 per month.
"THE COURT: I wondered who had been
reading my notes.
"MR. HOWARD: Well, I might as well
roll with the punches. That is what your calculations were, and I read it down and figured it
was $67.50, and that was the finding of the Court
on that, and we calculated what the Court had
written on that.
"THE COURT: Very well. I arrived at it
by adding everyone of the receipts you had, and
dividing it by the number of weeks. No, by the
number of months. I thought this looked wrong.
Eight months."
It thus appears that plaintiff's experts relied upon
an income for the machine which was found by the Court
at a prior hearing and expenses which were estimated.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES, IF RECOVERABLE AT ALL, ARE FOR THE LOSS OF ,

12

NET PROFITS. PLAINTIFF DID NOT
PROVE THE LOSS OF ANY NET PROFITS.
An action for damages for loss of profits in order
to be recoverable must be for the loss of net profits.
Authorities supporting this view are found on 28 ALR,
page 1510. Also see John A. Lee v. Durango Music,
a co-partnership, et al, 355 P. 2d, 1083; Groendyke
Transport ,Inc .v. Hal Merchant, 380 P. 2d, 682; and
B. T .Moran, Inc. v. First Security Corporation, supra.
Plaintiff's business never did operate at a profit
(Tr. 33). In order for the plaintiff to recover, the
plaintiff must take one of eighty-three machines and
establish with reasonable certainty that that particular
machine did operate at a profit. Since the whole business operated at a loss and there were no records for
this individual machine, the defendant is at a loss to
understand how there can be any recovery for loss of
net profits.
As stated before, plaintiff owned three machines
which were identical. The machine in question is one
of three.
There is nothing in the record to show what the
earnings of the other identical machines were. There
is no way of knowing if they operated at a profit or loss
except that the whole of the business operated at a loss.
There is no evidence from which the Court could have
concluded to what extent if any the plaintiff actually
suffered damages.
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The record is entirely silent with respect to the
question of availability of locations for machines. The
record does not _show whether the plaintiff had the
financial ability to obtain additional machines. The only
thing that does appear from the record is that wheu
this new machine was moved from the defendant's place
of business to some other place of business, an old machine was taken off location (Tr. 52).
The proper amount of damages to be awarded in
this ca,se would be the loss of the profits from the old
machine, which was taken out of service, together with
the difference between the profits earned by the machine in question in the defendant's place of business
and in its new location, whatever that amount might
be. No effort was made in this case to establish such
a figure. The Court recognized this situation when it
stated the following (Tr. 53) :
"Q What I am trying to get, is how long
were you deprived of the income of all three
machines?
"A Well, I just couldn't answer that for any
certainty."

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully submits that there is no
competent evidence in the record to support the trial
Court's finding. The evidence of plaintiff in its essenc,e
consisted of Dodge's guess and of Wade and Westphal s
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opinion that Dodge's guess was correct. Surely such
evidence does not constitute a reasonably certain basis
for establishing loss of net profits.
Respectfully submitted,
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
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